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ABSTRACT 
Existence of equilibrium of a continuous preference relation p or 
correspondence Pon a compact topological space W can be proved either by 
assuming acyclicity or convexity ( no point belongs to the convex hull of 
its preferred set ) . Since both properties may well be violated in both 
political and economic situations, this paper considers instead a "local" 
convexity property appropriate to a "local" preference relation or 
preference field. The local convexity property is equivalent to the non 
existence of "local" cycles. When the state space W is a convex set, or 
is a smooth manifold of a certain topological type, then the "local" 
convexity property is sufficient to guarantee the existence of a set of 
critical optima. 
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by 
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1. Introduction 
A fundamental question in both economic theory and social choice 
is whether a preference relation p on some set of feasible states 
or alternatives admits an equilibrium, choice or maximal element. 
The relation p might be defined in terms of the preferred choices 
of a number of winning coalitions, or result from the combination of 
preferred choices of individuals in the society. 
In social choice theory if the set W of alternatives is finite 
and the preference relation p is acyclic (admitting no cycle 
x p y1 py2 • • •  px) then there is a choice i such that y p x for no }'tW. 
When W is a compact topological space, and the preference correspondence 
is continuous, in the sense that for each x the set {yew: x p y} is 
open in w, then again there is a choice. 
The Ky Fan proof of existence of a choice assumes these two 
topological properties ( compactness of W and continuity of p) but 
instead of acyclicity assumes that W is convex, and p is semi-convex 
(a point never belongs to the convex hull of its preferred set). 
In social choice theory, and indeed in the theory of voting 
games ,it is not generally the case that acyclicity can be assumed, 
whereas in economic theory convexity, particularly of feasible or 
production sets, cannot readily be �ssumed. 
However, when the preference is not convex, if the state space 
W is a smooth manifold, then it is often possible to approximate the 
preference relation by a preference field H from W into the tangent 
space 'IW. At a point x the preference cone H(x) is the set of "small" 
preferred directions of change. It is shown that the appropriate convexity 
property is directly analogous to the property that at no point x in 
W does the origin, in the tangent space above x, belong to the convex 
hull of H(x). This property implies that, in some neighbourhood of 
the point x, there exists no "local" cycles of the underlying preference 
relation. When W is a convex set then this property implies the 
existence of a critical optimum for the preference field. 
As an application consider the pareto preference field for a 
society, defined in terms of small changes that benefit all individuals. 
When the space is convex then there exists a set of critical optima, 
where the field is empty. The set corresponds, in the multi-objective 
problem, to the set of singular points of a single smooth function. 
The result on existence of a critical optima set is also valid 
when W is a smooth compact manifold with non-zero Euler characteristic 
(as for example a topologically complete and contractible manifold) • 
Theoretically at least the results suggest a procedure for 
examining existence of equilibrium in a political economic environment. 
Suppose the economy has given resources and production functions for 
private goods, and a smooth production function able to transform private 
goods to public goods. It seems natural to suppose that this model 
defines a smooth manifold W of possible states. 
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The preferences of the society are then made up of individual 
preferences for private goods and political preferences for public 
goods. Local properties of these preferences then define a preference 
field, and the topological features of this field and of the state 
space W can then be used to determine whether local cycles exist and 
thus whether critical optima exist. 
2. Existence of Equilibrium 
Let W be a set of alternatives, and pCW x W a binary (preference) 
relation. We write xpy to mean x is preferred to y, where x and y 
are members of w. 
An important problem in economic theory and social choice concerns 
those properties of p and W which are sufficient to guarantee the 
existence of a choice, or equilibrium, for p on W. Here an element x<=. w 
is maximal or a choice for p on W iff x belongs to the choice set 
Cp(W) {x�W:ypx for no yt;. W}. 
In social choice theory the question is often posed in terms of 
existence of a family 'fJ of subsets of W, such that for each V€';J the 
choice set Cp (V) {x eV: ypx for no yG. V} is non empty. 
In this case Cp: � + 2W (where 2W is the power set of W) is known 
as a choice function. 
When W is a finite set of alternatives then acyclicity of p 
is sufficient to guarantee that Cp is a choice function for all sub-
sets of W (Sen, 1970) 
• 
Here the relation p is acyclic on the set W iff it is impossible 
to find a subset { x1, • • •  ,xr } 
in W such that x1
px
2
px3 • • •  x�x1 • 
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Notice that acyclicity implies both asymmetry (xpy implies not (ypx)) 
and irreflexivity (xpx for no xis W) . 
When W is not finite, but has a topology, then a continuity property 
for p is required for existence of a choice. Given the relation define 
the upper and lower (point to set) preference correspondences by: 
P : w + w: x ..,. {y tS w: ypx } 
P-:i- W -+ W: x..,. {yEW: xpy} 
Say that the preference relation p (or equivalently its preference 
correspondence P) is lower demi-continuous on W iff W is a topological 
space, and for every x�W, the set P-1(x) is open in the topology on W. 
Walker's Theorem (1977) 
If W is a compact topological space, and p an acyclic and lower 
demi-continuous preference then Cp(W) is non empty. 
Proof Suppose that Cp(W) = �. Then for every y€W there exists 
-1 some x � W such that xpy, or ye P (x) • -1 Hence K = {P (x) :xeW } 
is an open cover of w. Since W is compact, there exists a finite 
subcover {P-1(x): xts A} of K, where A is a finite subset of w. 
-1 But then, for every yr;. A there exists some x b A such that y .-P (x) , 
or xpy. Hence Cp(A) = �. Since A is finite, this contradicts 
the result that an acyclic preference relation on a finite set has 
a choice. Thus Cp(W) is non empty. 
• 
Moreover if we let :?' be the set of compact subsets of W, then 
Cp: ':1 -+ 2W will be a choice function. To see this we endow each member 
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V of ':1 with the relative topology, and define Cp (V) = { x c V: P (x) (') V = <I>}. 
Clearly P
-1
(x)nv will be open in the relative topology on v, and so, 
by the previous result, Cp(V) � <I>. 
The same result can be obtained if acyclicity of p is weakened 
to the finite maximality property, that for each finite set A cw, 
there exists some point xA 
in A such that P(xA
)(\A = <I>. 
(See Bergstrom 1975a, and Birchenhall, 1977, for further discussion 
of the relationship between acyclicity and existence of a choice) • 
An alternative proof of existence of a choice assumes convexity 
of the preference correspondence P and the space W instead of acyclicity 
of the preference relation. 
Call the space W an admissible space if it is a convex compact 
(subset of a) topological linear space Y. Say the preference relation 
p (or alternatively the preference correspondence P) is i) � iff for 
all xGW, either P(x) is empty or is a convex set in W, ii) semi-
convex iff for no x in W is it the case that x io ConP(x), where 
ConP(x) is the convex hull of the set P(x) in the convex set w. 
Ky Fan (1961) has shown the existence of a choice for a lower 
demi-continuous, semi-convex preference correspondence on an admissible 
space. 
The proof of the Ky Fan Theorem depends on the following theorem 
by Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (1929) 
First of all let {e.:j = l, • • .  ,n} be the standard basis of :R
n, 
J 
and for any subset M of N = { 1, • • •  , n} let ll M be the convex hull of 
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{ e . : j co M} . In particular 
J 
n 
ll
N 
n 
{ (x1, ... ,x ) € JR : l x. n + j=l J 
KKM Theorem 
l }· 
Let {K.: j€N} be a family of closed subsets of ll. 
J N 
each subset M of {l, • • •  ,n} let 
� UK . . je:M J 
For 
Suppose for each MC N, ll
M 
C KM, then there exists v € llN such that 
Vu ('\K 
j.;.N j 
• 
Ky Fan has extended this theorem. Suppose first of all that X is 
a subset of a topological vector space Y. For any set of points 
{ xi I:. X: i I: M 
} indexed by a finite index set let � be the convex hull 
of{ xi�X: i«:;M
}. 
Ky Fan Lemma 
Let K:X + Y be a (point set) correspondence, where for each x �x, K(x) 
is a closed set in Y, and there exists y 6 X such that K(y) is compact. 
Suppose that for any finite set of points Ut. & X: j e M} the convex 
J 
hull of this set, X , belongs to K = UK(x.). M M 
�M J 
Then (\ K (x) is non empty. 
x.:;x 
Outline of Proof Directly from the KKM theorem it is possible to 
show that for each finite set of points {x. E. X: j E: M} the intersection 
J 
('\ K(x.) is non empty. For each x � X, let P (x) = x,K(x), noting that 
j"M J 
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P(x) is open. 
Now LJ [K(y) ()P(x) ] K(yh n K(x) , 
xex x•X 
so when n K(x) is empty, {K(y) (\ P(x) : x ti X} is an open cover 
XliX 
for the compact set K(y) . 
But then there exists a finite index set M such that 
implying that nK(x.) = <I>. 
jGM J 
By contradiction, () K(x) is non empty. 
xir;X 
L) [K(yl n P Cx .l J 
;i=M J 
I 
Ky Fan used the above lemma to prove the following theorem. 
Ky Fan Theorem (1961) 
Let W be an admissible space and P:W + W a preference correspondence 
such that i) P is irreflexive (ie. x c;. P (x) for no x<i w ii) P is 
convex iii) the graph of P is open in W x W. Then there exists a 
choice X..w such that x•Cp(W) = {x6W:P(x) = <!>}. 
The proof procedure of Ky Fan was used by Bergstrom (1975b) to somewhat 
strengthen this theorem, by weakening the assumption of irreflexibility 
and convexity of P to semi-convexity, and weakening the requirement of 
an open graph to lower demi-continuity. 
Bergstrom Theorem (1975b) 
Let P be a lower demi-continuous and semi-convex correspondence 
on an admissible space W. Then there exists a choice x�W such that 
7 
K(y) ' 
x E! Cp(W) = {xe W:P(x) <I>}. 
Outline of Proof 
-1 Define the (weak) preference correspondence R:W + W by R(x) = w,p (x) . 
Since P is lower demi-continuous, R(x) is closed in W for each x€W. 
Now y�R(x) iff not(xpy) where p is the preference relation defined by 
P (i.e. xpy iff x€ P(y) ) .  Thus Cp(W) nR(x) . 
xew 
Let A be any finite set {x,:jcM} of points in W, and suppose that the 
J 
convex hull of A is not contained in 
\i UR(x.). j�M J 
Then there exists some yeCon(A) such that yEiR(x.) for no jt>M. 
J 
Thus yGP-1Cx.) for all jc;M, and so x.€.P(y) for all jc;;M. 
J J 
Thus the convex hull of {x.: j e. M} belongs to ConP (y) and so ye ConP (y) . 
J 
This violates semi-convexity of P. By contradiction 
Con (A) c. R
M
. 
By the Ky Fan Lemma, (\ R(x) is non empty. 
XliW 
Thus there exists a choice x e Cp (W) for P in W, such that P (x) 
Closer examination of the proof shows that the result can be 
<I>. 
I 
somewhat strengthened. If A {x.: j Ii M} is a finite set of points, 
J 
then under the conditions of the theorem (\ R(x) is non empty and 
x�A 
contained in the convex hull of A. Thus for any such finite set, 
A1in W, there exists a choice yE Con(A) such that 
P(y) () Con(A) <I>· 
Since the continuity and convexity properties of P are preserved on 
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the family d of admissible subsets of W, Bergstrom's Theorem shows 
that Cp is a choice function on ?J . 
Sonnenschein (1971) independently obtained a result similar to 
the Ky Fan Theorem and used it to show existence of demand functions 
in economic environments in the absense of individual preference 
transitivity (viz. xPy and yPz implies xPz for any x,y,z). 
As Sonnenschein noted, his result could be used to show existence 
of a choice in the absence of acyclicity. Sonnenschein's version of 
the theorem has also been used by Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) to 
generalise the classical results of Debreu (1952) and Arrow and Debreu 
(1954) on existence of a competitive economic equilibrium, and by 
Borglin and Keiding (1976) to show existence of Nash Equilibrium. 
Arrow (1969) has also used the result to show existence of a voting 
equilibrium in a majority rule game with an infinite electorate. 
Finally Aliprantis and Brown (1982) have exploited the fact that 
the Ky Fan theorem is true when W has arbitrary dimension to show the 
existence of a price equilibrium associated with a demand correspondence 
satisfying Walras' Law, when the price simplex is infinite dimensional. 
In case W is finite dimensional then the continuity requirement 
can be further weakened. Say that the preference correspondence P:W + W 
is lower hemi-continuous (lhc) iff for every open set U in W the set 
{xeW: P(x) () U t <I>} is also open in W. 
Clearly P is lhc. iff whenever Y6 w and U is an open neighbourhood 
of y in W, st. P(x)OU I <I> then there is a nbd. V of x, such that 
P (x') () U I <I> for all x' in V. A preference correspondence which is 
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lower demi-continuous is also lower hemi-continuous. To see this suppose 
P(x) n u I <I> for some x6 W, and some open set u in W. Then there exists 
-1 yi;u such that x� P (y). 
By assumption P-l(y) is open, amd so there is a neighbourhood 
-1 
V of x such that vc. P (y). Then, for all x'6V, YCP(x'l and so 
P(x')n ut <I>. Hence P islhc . 
In the case that W is an admissible space in the finite dimensional 
euclidean space R w we may weaken the assumption of lower demi-continuity 
of P to lower hemi-continuity in the Ky Fan Theorem. First of all, 
if �:W +W is a lhc. correspondence on a subset W of Rn such that 
for each x c; W, � (x) is a non empty and convex set, then by Michael's 
selection theorem (1956) there exists a continuous function f :W + W such 
that, for each x o;: W, f (x) b � (x) • 
Suppose now that P is a semi-convex and lsc correspondence 
on an admissible space W in :ni. w Since P is lsc, the correspondence 
� :W + W, where � (x) = ConP (x), is also lhc. If P (x) cl> for no x in 
W, then by Michael's selection theorem, there exists a continuous selection 
f:W + W of �. By Brouwer's fixed point theorem, since W is compact 
and convex, there exists a fixed point x = f (x) . But then x C:. conP (x) 
contradicting semi-convexity of P. Thus there exists a choice x of 
P from w such that P (x) = <I>. 
A related result by Gale and MasCollel (1975) shows the existence 
of a Nash equilibrium for a society N = { l, • • •  ,n}. Suppose each player 
i � N has an admissible strategy space W. in R w. Let W = n W. and let l. l. l. 
P.:W + W. be the ith players convex valued lower demi-continuous preference 
l. l. 
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correspondence (ie. for each x � W., P �l (x) is open in W). l. l. 
Let u .  l. 
{xew:P. (x) :/ �}. l. Then P . : u . _,. w . l. l. l. is lower h3I!1i-continuous 
on U. and by Michael's selection theorem has a continuous selection l. 
f.:U. -+ w .. Let 6.:W -+ W. be the correspondence taking the value 
l. l. l. l. l. 
fi 
(X) for X € U
i
' and W elsewhere. 
Then e = rriei:W-+ W is an upper herni continuous correspondence (ie if 
eCx) belongs to an open set V in W, then there is an open set u of 
x in W such that 6(x') belongs to V for all x'6U) . By the Kakutani 
(1941) theorem, there exists a fixed point Y€ 6(y) . If we assume that 
for no x "W is x .a I!P. (x) , then the fixed point y must be a Nash equilibrium l. l. 
satisfying P. (y) l. � for all i. 
Clearly this result can be obtained directly from the Ky Fan theorem, 
illustrating the close relationship between the Ky Fan Theorem 
and fixed point theorems for compact convex sets. 
Although the Ky Fan-Sonnenschein-Bergstrom theorem has wide 
application in economic theory and game theory, one obvious difficulty 
is the assumption that the preference correspondence be semi-convex. 
In the usual applications the preference correspondence P at x may be 
defined to be a subset of �(x) , where �(x) is a feasible set dependent 
on the state of the world, x. 
In many instances �(x) will be a production set, and it would be useful 
to be able to extend the analysis to non convex production sets. 
This difficulty is even more pronounced in social choice applications. 
Consider for example a simple majority voting game with three individuals, 
on a compact policy space W of two dimensions. Suppose that the preferences 
11 12 
of the three individuals are convex and represented by smooth utility functions. 
In figure 1 are drawn indifference curves for the individuals through a 
point x. Since any two individuals form a winning coalition, the socially 
preferrred set P(x) at x is the union of the three shaded sets in the diagram. 
Clearly x belongs to the convex hull of P(x), violating the semi-convexity 
requirement of the Ky Fan Theorem. If we let p
i 
represent the preference 
relation of player i, then we see that ap1bp2c,bp2cp2a and cp3ap3b. 
Thus we obtain a social preference cycle apbpcpa (see Kramer, 1973, and 
Schofield, 1977 for further discussion of this example) . 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
This indicates that there is a connection between acyclicity and 
semi-convexity of a social preference correspondence. 
The purpose of the rest of this paper is to obtain an equilibrium 
theorem which does not implicitly make use of global convexity or 
acy.:::licity properties. Instead we consider a preference field, which 
at each point specifies the direction of preferred change. The continuity 
property which we asswne for this field allows us to examine a "small" 
preference correspondence, or deformation of the space W. The construction 
pennits the use of general topological arguments to show existence of 
a choice or equilibrium when the space W has a certain topological nature. 
In particular it is shown that on an admissible space, the non 
existence of "local" cycles is equivalent to a "local" convexity property, 
and thus sufficient to guarantee the existence of a "local" equilibrium. 
The procedure is analogous to the proof of existence of a singular point 
for a smooth function. 
3. Equilibrium of a Preference Field 
Let W be a smooth manifold and TW the tangent bundle, with 
TI= TW + W the bundle map. At a point x•W, TI-1(x) is the tangent space 
at x, isomorphic to :Rw, where w is the dimension of W. A point in 
TI-1(x) is called a tangent vector at x. (See for example Hirsch, 1976, 
for a full discussion) • The tangent space is locally trivial in the 
-1 "' w sense that for a neighbourhood u of x, TI (U) "' u x 1R . If u:W + ll. is 
a smooth function, then the differential du(x) of u at x may be regarded 
as a linear function du(x):TI
-1
(x) + 1R. In the case that W is a subset 
of euclidean space, then the differential du is a continuous function 
du:W + L(:Rw,1R) where L(1Rw,Jl.) is the space of linear functions from 
w 
1R to 1R with the usual topology. 
Definition 1 
i) A vector field, X, is a smooth function X:W + TW such that for 
each x£W at which x is defined, X(x)ETI
-1
(x). 
1.J 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
v) 
vi) 
A preference field H:W + TW is a corresµmdence which satisfies, 
wht..11ever H (x) is non empty, the following properties 
a) 
-1 
H(x) t:: TI (x) 
b) H(x) is a cone, i.e. if v £ H(x) is a tangent vector, 
then AvGH(x) for all real A >o. 
c) 0 t H(x). 
A vector field X is integral for a preference field H on an o pen 
set VCW iff X(x)G:H(x) for all x6V (note that X(x) r. 0 for all 
xeV). 
A preference field H is continuous iff for each XiW such that 
H(x) ,. ¢ it is the case that for each v&H(x) there is a neigh-
bourhood V(x) of x in W and a vector field X, integral for H 
on V(x) with X(x) = v. 
A preference field H is s-continuous iff H is continuous and, 
for each :x&W it is the case that al H(x) is open in TI
-1
(x) 
and bl if VfH(x) and X is a vector field such that X(x) = v, 
then x is integral for H on a neighbourhood V(x) of x. 
A preference field is half open iff, for each xoW, either H(x) 
is empty, or there exists a linear function f:TI
-1
(x) + Jl. 
such that f (v) > 0 for all v e H (x) • 
The property called S-continuity here was first introduced by 
Smale (1973). Its significance is that it pennits integration of 
the field to give a preference relation intrinsic to the field, and defined 
in the following way. 
If c: (-1,1) + W is a smooth curve in w, then the derivative [c](x) 
at a point x c(t),t€(-l,l), is a tangent vector in TI
-1
(x). If H 
l 
is a preference field on W and there is a smooth curve c: (-1,1) + W 
such that [c]CxH�H(x) whenever x =  c(t), t"(-1,1), then c is called 
an integral � of H. An integral curve,c, of the field H from x = c(O) 
to y = t�c(t) we shall call a preference �of H from x to y. 
A local preference relation p on W is a binary relation on W 
such that ypx iff there is a smooth curve c:(-1,1) + W such that 
x = c(O),y = limc(t) and c(t)pc(t'l whenever -1 < t' < t < 1. 
t+l 
Suppose now that H is a continuous preference field, and that 
H(x) ! $. Then there exists a vector field, X, integral for H on 
a neighbourhood V of x, and therefore an integral curve c:(-1,1) + W 
of H such that c(O) = x. We shall write ypHx whenever there is a 
preference curve for H from x to a point y in the neighbourhood of x. 
In this way we obtain a local preference relation pH whic
h is intrinsic 
to the preference field H. 
Definition 2 
Let H be a continuous preference field. 
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i) A point xe.w belongs to the critical (or infinitesimal) cycle � IC(H), 
of H iff there exist a finite set of tangent vectors {v.GH(x) :j=l, • • •  ,r} J 
ii) 
and a set of non negative real numbers 0. .flR :j=l, • • •  ,r} such 
J 
that 
0 
r 
l A.V 
j=l J j 
(The vectors v1, • • •  vr are called semipositively dependent). 
A point x.c;w belongs to the local cycle set, LC(H), of H iff 
for � neighbourhood V(x) of x there exists a finite set of 
iii) 
alternatives {y1, • . •  ,y } and a p cycle r H 
xpH
y
l HY2·····PHYrX' 
where the preference paths making up this cycle belong to the 
neighbourhood V(x) • 
A point :xeW belongs to the critical (or infinitesimal) optima 
set,IO(H), of H iff H(x) = $. 
• 
A previous paper (Schofield,1978) showed, for the S-continuous 
preference field H0 defined by a voting game, when individuals have 
smooth preferences, that the critical cycle set belonged to the local 
cycle set. 
N 
u 
For example suppose that the individual preferences of a society 
{l, • • •  ,n} are represented by a smooth utility profile 
(u1, • • •  ,un):W + lR
n
. Define the preference ™of i at x to be 
H. (x) l. {v611
-1(x): du. (x) (v) > o}. l. 
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E'or a coalition MCN, let H (x) = (\ H. (x) be the pareto preference field. M i£M J. 
Clearly each preference field Hi will be S-continuous, and so therefore 
will be H
M
(x). A voting game a for N is characterised by a collection 
i@of winning coalitions. The preference field H of the game is then 
a 
given by H (x) = LJ H (x), and so H :W + 'lW is S-continuous. a M"-� M a 
(See Schofield, 1980, for further details). 
Consider again the three person voting game on m.2 considered in 
the previous section, and represented by Figure 1. 
Figure 2 shows the direction gradients {d11.(x) :i=l,2,3} for the 
three players. For any two player coalition {i,j}, let H . .  (x) 1J 
represent the preference cone at x. It is clearly possible to find three 
vectors v,tH13(x), vbe
H12(x) and Ve€ H23(x) such that {va,vb,vc} are 
semipositively dependent. Moreover it is possible to find a preference 
curve for coalition {1,3} from x to a nearly point a such that both 
1 and 3 prefer a to x. In the same way coalition {1,2} prefers b to x, 
and coalition {2,3} prefers c to x. By this method a social preference 
cycle is constructed. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Note that the point x belongs to the critical cycle set IC(H0) of 
H0 where a is the game with winning coalitions {1,2} ,{l,3},{ 2,3}. Schofield 
(1978) has shown that wherever a point x belongs to IC(H
0
) then in any 
neighbourhood of x there exists a preference cycle of the underlying local 
preference relation. 
Here we show that IC(H) and LC(H) are essentially identical, for 
any arbitrary s-continuous field. 
17 
Lemma 1 
Let H:W -+ 'IW be a continuous preference field on a smooth manifold 
W. Then 
Int IC (H) C LC (H) • 
If H is S-continuous, then IC(H) is open and 
IC (H) C LC (H) C ClosIC (H) • 
(Here Int and Clos stand for interior and closure). 
Outline of proof i) If xeIC(H) then clearly H(x) is not half open, 
since there can exist no linear function f:JJ
-1
(x) -+ lR such that f(v) > O 
for all v&H(x). When H is S-continuous then by the results of Schofield 
(1978) there exists an open neighbourhood V(x) of x in IC(H). A pH 
cycle can then be constructed within V(x). 
If H is continuous and x € IntIC (H), then there exists a neighbourhood 
V(x) of x in IC(H), and again a PH-cycle can be constructed within V(x). 
ii) Suppose now that there is a neighbourhood V(x) of x such that 
V (x) (\IC (H) � 
• We seek to show that x i!°LC(H). 
If x �· LC (H) then there exists a piecewise differentiable PH - cycle 
l Ix,yl)U {yl,y2)\J • • •  1.J[yr,x). 
By careful choice of coordinate charts we may choose the tangent 
vector v.(z) at any point z on the jth component of this path to be fixed 
J 
in JRw and equal to v., for j = l, • • •  ,r+l. This gives a sequence of J 
vectors v1, • • •  ,vr+l in lR
w, forming a piecewise differentiable cycle 
in lR w. Consequently { v 1
, 
• • •  , v r+l} must be semiposi tively dependent. 
Moreover by s-continui ty, each v. belongs to H (x) • Thus x belongs to 
J 
IC(H). By contradiction x ¢LC(H). 
• 
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Thus when H is an s-continuous preference field1local cycles of 
the underlying preference relation do not exist iff the critical cycle 
set is empty. Note however that even when IC (H) is empty there may 
well be a "global" cycle of the preference relation p H. 
We now seek to show that when there exists no local cycles (ie 
when IC (H) = ip) then there exists a critical optimum. 
Note first of all that x l< IO (H) iff yp 
H
x for no yi;w. To see this, 
if H(x) ii> there can be no integral curve through x. On the other hand 
if H(x) t .J> then there must exist an integral curve at x, and so 
yP
H
x for some y�W. 
When H:W ->- TW is a preference field on a smooth manifold W, 
let H:W ->- W be the preference correspondence induced from H by 
H:W ->- W:x ->- {YEW:ypHx }. 
As before �-1:w ->-W is the inverse preference correspondence. 
Lemma 2 
If H:W ->- TW is an S-continuous preference field on a smooth manifold, 
then H:W ->- W is lower demi-continuous. 
Proof Consider Yl'OH
-1(x). By definition xpHy, and so there is an 
integral curve of H from y to x. By S-continuity there is a neighbourhood 
V(y) of y such that for any zc;.V(y) there is an integral curve of H from 
z to x. Thus xp
H
z for all z'V(y). ·-1 Thus H (x) is open. 
I 
In general when H is an s-continuous preference field on a manifold 
with IC (H) = ii> we cannot show that IO (H} = ii> • However by lemma 1, 
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the set LC(H) is empty. For any point x W, there will exist a neighbourhood 
U of x containing no P
H
-cycles. For any compact set V within U, Walker's 
theorem together with the lower demi-continuity of H implies t.i;at there 
exists some x within v such that H (x}nv ii>. In other words at 
x, the preferred set H (�) is either empty or: the preferred directions 
point "out of V". 
Since there may exist "global" PH cycles, we cannot show H(x) 
for some xi;;w. In the case that W is an admissible set in euclidean 
space 1R w, however, we can show that the critical optima is non empty 
whenever the critical cycle set is empty. 
ii> 
To do this we now assume W is a smooth admissible set of dimension 
w in finite dimensional euclidean space. In particular this implies 
that for each point x in the interior of w, rr-1(x) can be identified 
with 1R w. Since W is assumed to be compact, convex there exists a 
smooth boundary aw. At any point x in aw there is a normal, n (x) , 
pointing into W, and the tangent space at x is then the closed half 
space {�1Rw:v.n(x) > O} defined by this normal, where • is the usual 
scalar product. Given a preference field H:W ->- TW we define a preference 
correspondence H:W ->- W by 
H(x) ii> iff H(x) ii> 
H(x) {z6W: z x + v for v £ H (x) } • 
Note that in a sense, H is an approximation to the preference correspondence 
H associated with p
H. By the properties of a preference field, H(x) 
is a cone in rr
-1(x) and O¢H(x). Thus for each Vt. H(x) there exists 
a ray x + "Av in H (x), where I. > O. However x.f. H (x). It is precisely 
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when xe.IC(H) that x bConH(x). 
Thus the property IC(H) <P for a preference field is essentially 
the analogue of the convexity property for a preference correspondence. 
Theorem l 
If H:W + TW is a S-continuous preference field on a smooth admissible 
space W in lR w then IC (H) = <P implies that IO (H) f <P. 
Proof Suppose that x..:Confi(x). Then there exists a solution to the 
equation 
x 
r 
l A.Z. 
j=l J J 
each A. > 0 ,  and z. 6 H (x). 
J - J 
r 
where /: A. 
j=l J 
l ,  
By definition z. x + v. where v. E. H (x) • 
r 
Hence l A .v. 
j=l J J 
Thus x e IC (H) • 
J J J 
O for semi-positive A ( Al' 
• • •  , Ar). 
If IC(H) = <P then for no xe.w does x4':ConH(x). 
Just as in lemma 2, H-1(x) = {y•W: x&H(y)} is open in W for each X6W. 
By the Ky Fan Theorem, there exists some choice x such that H(x) = <P 
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If H (x) to <P then clearly there exists v e H (x) yet z x + Av t W for any A > O. 
This implies that x belongs to the boundary of w ,  and v does not belong 
-1 
to n (x). 
Thus H(x) = <P and so IO(H) f <P. 
• 
Consider again the case of a society N = {l, • . •  ,n} where each 
individual has smooth preference on w. The pareto preference field 
HN:W + TW is s-continuous and IC(HN) <P. 
To see this note that at any point x in w1dui (x) (v) > O for any iG N 
and any v eH
N
(x). Thus HN
(x) is half open. If W is admissible then 
by Theorem l ,  IO (HN
) of <P. 
Suppose that xfIO(HN
). Then there exists a preference curve for 
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H
N 
from x to a nearby point y. This implies that ui (y) 
> u
i (x) for all ie N. 
If we write y p
N
x ,  in this case, where p
N 
is the pareto (or unanimity) 
relation , and let the pareto set be the choice set under this relation , 
then we see that any point x outside IO(H
N
) cannot belong to the pareto 
set. In other words the pareto set must belong to the critical 
optima set IO(H
N
). Thus IO(H
N
) is the analogue, in this multi-objective 
optimization problem , of the set of critical points in the single 
objective optimization problem. When individual preferences are convex 
then IO(H
N
) will be identical to the pareto set. In the case of 
non-convex preferences , IO(H
N
) will contain the equivalent of societal 
minima and saddle points. 
Smale (1974) has shown that an interior point, x ,  of W belongs 
to IO(H ) iff {du. (x): ico N }  
N l. 
are semi-positively dependent viz. 
l\ du
i 
(x) o for semi-positive A =  (A1 , . • •  ,Au). Moreover Smale (
1982) 
and Porteous (1970) have shown that a Hessian can then be defined at x 
to determine the stability properties of the optima points. 
In the more general case of a voting game,o , Figures l and 2 show 
that even with convex individual preferences on an admissible space ,  
there i s  n o  reason t o  expect IO(HJ .p. As Figure 2 makes evident 
the point x belongs to the convex hull of H
0(x). 
However it is possible to show that for a voting game o, there is 
an integer v(o) such that if the policy space W is of dimension less 
than v(o) then IC(H
0) must be empty (Schofield 1983a,1983b). 
The motivation of the final section of this paper is to determine 
what global topological features of a smooth manifold W are sufficient 
to ensure that local acyclicity implies the existence of a choice of the 
preference field. 
4. Equilibriwn on a Manifold 
Section 2 of this paper showed the close relationship between the 
Ky Fan Theorem for a preference correspondence on a convex compact set, 
and the Kakutani fixed point theorem. In Section 3 it was shown that if 
a preference field H satisfied what was essentially a local convexity 
property on an admissible set then a local equilibrium IO(H) exists. 
The rootivation for this section of the paper is to parallel the extension 
of the Kakutani fixed point theorem to a wider class of topological 
spaces. See Eilenberg-Montgomery (1946), Begle (1950), Gorniewicz 
and Granas (1970) and Powers (1970) for extensions of the Kakutani fixed 
point theorem. 
We shall call a topological space W trivial if the homology groups 
H (W) are zero, for all q > O. Two continuous maps f,g:X + Y are 
q 
homotopic iff there is a continuous map F:X x fO,l] + Y such that 
F(x,O) = f(x) and F(x,l) g(x), V x�X. 
Homotopic maps induce identical map� at the homology level 
f*,g*:H*(X) + H*(Y). 
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If the identity map on W is homotopic to the constant map 
W + x0,x0e W, then W is contractible and therefore trivial. 
If f:X + Y is a continuous map then define the Lefshetz number 
of f to be 
,\(f) = I <-llq trace (f ) 
q q 
where f : H (X) + H (Y). 
q q q 
When W is a compact manifold and f: W + W t hen ,\(f) � 0 implies 
that f has a fixed point x s.t. x Sf(x). See Brown (1970). For example 
if W is trivial then the only non zero homology group is H0(W) = Q, 
where Q is the coefficient field. In this case ,\(fl � 0 and so f must 
have a fixed point. 
This result can be extended to cover a correspondence P:W + W 
when P(x) is trivial for all x (see Eilenberg-Montogomery). 
Of particular interest is the identity map Id: W + W where 
,\(Id) = L (-l)q 
q 
X(W) of W. 
dim (H (W)) is also called the Euler characteristic 
q 
For e xample X(S
w
) l + (-1) 
w o if w is odd 
2 if w is even. 
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A function f:W + W, homotopic to the identity, is called a deformation 
of W, and has Lefshetz number X(W). If x(W) = ,\(Id) = ,\(f} � 0 then 
the deformation f must have a fixed point. 
Thus any deformation f of the even dimensional sphere s
2k 
has 
,\(fl . 
2k+l 
2 and thus must have a fixed point. On the other hand S 
admits a fixed point free deformation. In the same way the torus 
2 l 1 2 T 
= s x S has X ( T ) 0 and admits fixed point free deformations. 
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Theorem 2 
If H: W + 'lW is an S-continuous preference field on a smooth w-dimensional 
compact manifold W with non zero Euler characteristic, then IC(H) \.) IO(H) is 
non empty. 
Proof 
w 
Let 6 :UCW + VCR be a chart on w and let H8 :V + TV be the 
projection under this chart of the preference field H. If IO(H) <P 
H(x) r <P, all �W. As in the proof of Theorem ).,let 1\J :V + V 
be the associated lower demi-continuous preference correspondence. 
By Michael's selection theorem there exists a selection f:V + V for 
ConH6. Moreover since IC(H) = .p, at no point xE u is it the case that 
6 (x) w ConH6 (6 (x)). Thus f (6 (x)) r 6 (x). 
From S-continuity, f:V + V can be chosen ho11Ptopic to the identity. 
Thus f can be pulled back to u to give a deformation f
u
:U + u. 
Finally the deformations for a family of charts can be pieced together 
to give a deformation f:W + W, such that for no x� W does x f(x). 
then 
However if X(W) r O, then W admits no fixed point free deformation. 
Consequently it cannot be the case that both IC(H) and IO(H) are empty. 
As an illustration of the requirement that X(W) r O, consider 
the preference field H on the one-dimensional sphere s1 which assigns 
the tangent vector +l at each point. Clearly IC(H) = <P yet there is 
a global P
H
-cycle obtained by integrating the flow round the circle. 
This is associated with a deformation f:a +a + 6 (in radial coordinates). 
Thus the preference field has no equilibrium. 
[Insert figure 3 about here ] 
Consider now a preference field H on the two dimensional sphere, 
where the field at a point x is the half open cone po inting in a 
northerly direction but twisted slightly a few degrees of longitude east 
(as in figure 4). 
[Insert figure 4 about here] 
Clearly there is 
since IC(H) is empty, 
a p
H
-cycle round each latitude of the sphere. 
and x<s2> = o there exists an optima set IO(H). 
However 
In fact this set will consist of the two poles: the south pole is 
an unstable optimum (the p
H 
flow leaves this point) and there is a 
stable optimum at the north pole. 
A field of this kind could characterise a pattern of winds which 
tended to blow in a general north easterly direction. Note that neither 
Walker's acyclicity theorem nor Ky Fan•s convexity theorem can be used 
to show existence of optima or singularity points of the field in this 
example. 
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Figure 1 
Acyclic and convex individual preferences, 
resulting in a social preference which 
violates acyclicity and semi-convexity. 
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Figure 2 
Three coalition preference cones 
at point x in the critical cycle 
set. 
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Figure 3 
A preference field H and an associated 
deformation on the circle, sl, showing 
no local cycles, no equilibrium, yet a 
global cycle. 
Caption: 
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Figure 4 
A preference field H on the sphere, s2, 
showing no local cycles, a global cycle, 
and both stable and unstable equilibria. 
